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of acquittal is supported by the evidence there would clearly be double
jeopardy.33 The proposal for a state statute might read:
An appeal may be taken by the state from any judgment adverse to
the state:
1. upon questions of law arising upon the trial and
2. with the permission of the trial judge.
A judgment acquitting the defendant of all or part of the charge
shall be deemed adverse to the state. Such a right as appeal by the
state from an acquittal is further conditioned upon prompt applica-
tion for permission to appeal. Such application must come before
discharge of the accused.
Such a proposal places three safeguards upon possible abuse by
the state. First, there can clearly be no appeal upon the facts of the
case as to their sufficiency to support the jury's verdict of acquittal.
The right can only be invoked to test the rulings of the trial court on
matters such as admissibility of evidence, an order setting aside a con-
viction, or an erroneous instruction. Secondly, with the consent of the
trial judge as a prerequisite to the state's appeal, it could not be termed
an absolute right but rather a discretionary right. Thirdly, the ap-
plication for permission to appeal must be prompt and before dis-
charge of the defendant. This provision would prevent the accused
from being apprehended after discharge and termination of jeopardy in
the cause.
Henry H. Dickinson
THE RUNNING OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN KENTUCKY
The purpose of this note is to determine under what conditions a
vendee of property in Kentucky is bound by, or may enforce, covenants
made by his vendor. This requires a study of Kentucky cases involving
covenants running with the land. These cases will be analyzed to
determine the extent to which orthodox doctrine is now applied in
light of modem policy.
Restrictions on the free use of land are not new. Licenses, ease-
ments, retaining wall agreements, leases and subdivision restrictions
have been known since early times.' The last seventy-five years, how-
ever, have seen the most rapid increase in the amount of land trans-
ferred within the restricted subdivision scheme. This increase, to a
great extent, has been due to the demand by individuals for protection
3328 Jour. of Crim. Law 919, 923 (1938).
1 Horack and Nolan, Land Use Controls 202 (1955).
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of their economic investment in residential property. The courts are
willing to enforce these restrictions because of the benefit received
by the community in obtaining assurance of an orderly expansion in
residential developments. Naturally such agreements would not be
effective to secure stable land values if they were construed as mere
personal agreements and not binding on subsequent vendees. As the
land would be transferred the original agreement would be unenforce-
able against subsequent buyers.
Two concepts, historically, have been used by the courts to hold a
subsequent vendee of realty to the covenants of his vendor:
First. The oldest of these concepts is known by the phrase, "cove-
nant running with the land at law." This is merely a phrase which
describes the situation where a court at law will find subsequent
vendees subject to the restrictions as established between the original
covenantor and covenantee. The classical requirements of a covenant
running with the land are:2 (1) Privity, (2) Intention, (3) Form, (4)
Touch and Concern, (5) Notice. These are strict requirements which
seriously limited the usefulness of the concept of real covenants.
Second. The other concept, equitable in nature, used to bind sub-
sequent purchasers to the covenants of their vendor is usually known
as an "equitable servitude." The concept was first used in Tulk v.
Moxhay3 to relieve the rigors of the requirements at law. The classical
requirements of an equitable servitude are: (1) Notice of the covenant
and (2) Intention that subsequent purchasers be bound.4 The Tulk
decision, due to its liberal standards, was a great benefit to English
landowners who desired more property regulation. It answered needs
created by the growth of modem cities and the crowded conditions
of modem life.5
Are the foregoing requirements of orthodox doctrine accepted in
Kentucky today? This can only be answered by looking at the cases
and taking up each requirement separately.
PRIVITY OF ESTATE
One requirement of a covenant at law, and perhaps the most
stringent, is privity of estate.6 The exact meaning of this term is in
2 Clark, Covenants and Interests Running with Land 94 (2d ed. 1947); Pat-
ton on Titles 1036 (1938). Also see Wheeler v. Schad, 7 Nev. 204 (1871).
3 2 Phillips 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848).
4 Equitable Servitudes-The Running of Covenants in Equity, 2 Md. L.R.
265, 270 (1937-38). Some courts may require additional elements, i.e., a writing
or that the covenant must touch and concern. See Sprague v. Kimball, 213 Mass.
380, 100 N.E. 622 (1913); 2 American Law of Property, 415 (1952).5 Barkley, Equitable Servitudes, 1 Baylor L.R. 440 (1948-49); Clark, supra
note 2 at 170.
6 Clark, supra note 2 at 111.
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doubt. Several divergent views7 are taken as to the elements necessary
to its fulfillment: (1) succession to the estate of one of the parties
to the covenant;8 (2) succession of estate between covenantor and
covenantee; 9 (3) mutual and simultaneous interest of the cove-
nanting parties in the land;' 0 and (4) the landlord and tenant relation-
ship."
The only Kentucky case found that mentions the word "privity" is
Swiss Oil Company v. Dials,12 a 1929 decision. There it is stated: 13
It is the general rule that, in order to make a covenant
run with the land of the covenantor and bind his heirs and assigns,
the covenantee must have such an interest in the land as to amount
to privity of estate between the parties to the covenant; and, strictly
speaking, such privity must exist between the parties when the
covenant is made.
This vague language might imply that the court has adopted the
second or third view of privity but the facts of the case do not support
such a conclusion. A covenant was put in an oil lease between the
land owner (plaintiff) and his lessee. The oil lease was subsequently
assigned to the defendant. The assignee claimed not to be bound by
the original covenant. The court found the covenant to run with the
land since privity existed and it was the intention of the parties that
subsequent lessees be bound. Thus, the facts of the case support only
the proposition that privity is necessary between landlord and tenant.' 4
This holding has little significance for the general requirement of
privity. Privity is always present in the landlord and tenant relation-
ship. Such a case cannot be used as a stepping-stone to the proposition
that Kentucky requires privity of estate where a landlord-tenant
relationship does not exist. In fact the Swiss Oil case seems to place
emphasis on intention, not privity, when it says, "The important con-
sideration is whether the covenant is intended to be and is annexed
to the estate."15
7 Ibid.8 Ibid. This view of privity differs from the others for it only requires suc-
cession between the covenanting party and his assign. Such a relationship will
always exist with the possible exception of an adverse possessor or where the
land has been assigned for life with remainder over. This view, essentially, places
no restriction on a covenant running with the land. See Holmes, The Common
Law, 404 (1881).9 Ibid. Holmes and Clark find this to be an entirely unjustifiable meaning.10 This is the Massachusetts view. Clark, supra note 2 at 128.
11 This is the English view. 2 American Law of Property 336 (1952).
12232 Ky. 298, 22 S.W. 2d 912 (1929). This case is later mentioned in
Commonwealth v. Elkhorn Piney Coal Mining Co., 241 Ky. 245 at 250; 43 S.W.
2d 684 at 686 (1931) and in Warfield National Gas Co. v. Small, 282 Ky. 347 at
350; 138 S.W. 2d 488 at 489 (1940). Neither cites the Swiss Oil Case as standing
for the requirement of privity.
13 Id. at 22 S.W. 2d 914.
14This is the English view. Supra note 11. 15 Supra note 13.
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The Kentucky reports are full of cases dealing with covenants but
no decision subsequent, or prior, to the Stviss Oil case has been found
which mentions privity. Another Kentucky case, on its facts, does aid
in dispelling any illusions that privity is a necessity. Ferguson v. Wor-
rall16 involved adjacent lot owners who entered into an agreement for
the erection of a party-wall. One person was to build the wall on the
party-line and bear the total expense. The other party covenanted
that if he should ever use the wall as part of a building he would bear
one-half the expense of the original cost. The court, many years later,
held that the agreement to reimburse ran with the land and was bind-
ing on the first subsequent vendee who, with notice, used the wall.
No privity (within the common law view of number two) existed here
-yet the court enforced the covenant, without mention of privity,
while saying, "The criterion for determining whether a covenant runs
with the land is the intention of the parties."17 The court again placed
its emphasis on intention and notice-not privity.
However, the Ferguson case, as standing for no need of privity,
may be weak in two aspects. First, it could be argued that privity
does exist because the wall is on the property line and it is the basis
of mutual or cross easements (view number three).18 The objection
to this argument is that the easement would not exist until sometime
after the covenant and this could not satisfy the requirements of privity
under views number two and three.19 Second, a party-wall case is a
poor case upon which to base any conclusion concerning privity. It
seems that the courts, contrary to theory, have seldom required
privity to be present in such cases in order that subsequent parties
will be bound to the covenants of their vendors.20
No other Kentucky cases have been found which bear significantly
on the requirement of privity. The facts of all reviewed cases present
facts which place the parties within a privity relation-yet the court
does not speak of privity. Since the court has not mentioned privity
since 1929, it is doubtful if the requirement now exists.2 '
16 125 Ky. 618, 101 S.W. 966 (1907).
17 Id. at 101 S.W. 968.
18 Aigler, The Running With The Land of Agreements to Pay For a Portion
of the Cost of Party Walls, 10 Mich. L.R. 187 (1912); Clark, supra note 2 at 150,
n. 19.
'9 Clark, supra note 2 at 154, n. 30.
20 Id. at 127, n. 108.
21 Louisville H. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Baskett, 184 Ky. 822, 121 S.W. 957 (1909)
has had a history of being cited for the proposition that Kentucky requires privity.
Clark, in his first edition, cited it as applying the Massachusetts view of privity.
See Clark, Covenants and Interests Running With Land 108, n. 82 (1st ed. 1929).
But it is noticeable that in Clark's second edition the case is cited as a "privity"
case. See Clark, supra note 2 at 252. Tiffany, too, cites the case for the second
Noms
INTENTION
The second requirement for a covenant to bind subsequent pur-
chasers of the land is intention. The covenanting parties must intend
that all subsequent owners be bound by the covenant before it will
become binding on them. This is one element universally accepted in
law and in equity- 2 Maynard v. Ratliff,23 a 1944 Kentucky case, states,
"The criterion for determining whether a covenant runs with the land
or is merely personal is the intention of the parties."24 A more recent
case, Bagby v. Stewart's Ex'r.,25 reiterated this point when the court
stated,20
The right of a person not a party to a restrictive covenant
to enforce it depends upon the intention of the parties in imposing it.
In order to confer such a right upon one not a party to the agreement,
it must appear that it was the intention of the covenantee to create
a servitude or right which should run with the land. It is not neces-
sary that such an intention appear from the express language of the
instrument creating it, but it may be implied where it appears that it
was imposed as part of a general building plan or scheme ...
Thus, it is clear that Kentucky will not bind subsequent purchasers
of land to the covenants of their vendors unless the covenanting parties
clearly intend the vendees to be bound.
FORM
Correct form is often listed as the third element necessary for a
covenant to bind those not a party to it. Several factors are embodied
in correct form, but only the most important, a writing, will be herein
considered. The requirement of writing has been held to be necessary
for full compliance with the statute of frauds, 27 although some courts
may confuse it with notice. A frequently recurring situation arises
when the grantee covenants in writing with the grantor that his
(grantee's) land is to be bound but the grantor merely makes an oral
type of privity. See Tiffany, Real Property 1408, n. 18 (2d ed. 1920). The facts
of the case actually contain privity in both senses, i.e., grant to a railroad, by deed,
of a right of way. However, the court did not mention privity nor make it an
essential requirement. Hence, the case does not stand for the proposition for
which it is cited.
";'Pound, The Progress of the Law 1918-1919, 38 Harvard L.R. 813 at 815
(1920); supra note 16.
23297 Ky. 127, 179 S.W. 2d 200 (1944).
24 Id. at 179 S.W. 202. For other cases in accord, see: Kentucky Central R.R.
v. Kenney, 82 Ky. 154, 6 Ky. Law Rep. 17 (1884); Ferguson v. Worrall, 125 Ky.
618, 101 S.W. 966 (1907); Parrish v. Newbury, 279 S.W. 2d 229, 233 (Ky. 1955).
2 265 S.W. 2d 75 (Ky. 1954).
20 Id. at 76.
27Sprague v. Kimball, 213 Mass. 280, 100 N.E. 622 (1913) (applied the
statute of frauds to equitable servitudes); Sims, The Law of Real Covenants:
Exceptions to the Restatement of the Subject by the American Law Institute, 30
Cornell L.Q. 1, 27 (1944-45).
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promise, or indicates his intention by a general scheme, to bind the
remainder of his (grantor's) land. Can the remainder thus be bound?
Several Kentucky cases present fact situations which raise this dif-
ficult question, but none of them mentions the statute of frauds.
Bondurant v. Paducah and I. Ry. Co. 2 s is such a case. The common
grantor divided a large tract of land into lots and streets. The grantor
(covenantee) placed a restriction in the deed to the property which
plaintiff (assignee of the covenantor) eventually purchased. The re-
striction prohibited the use of the lot for any business which may be-
come a nuisance. Nothing was written in the plaintiff's deed about
similarily restricting grantors remaining property. The defendant rail-
road bought another of grantor's lots but no similar restrictions were
inserted in his deed. Plaintiff sued in equity to recover damages for
what plaintiff termed a breach of the covenants mutually imposed on
the lots by the intent of the grantor as shown by an alleged general
scheme.
The Kentucky tribunal rejected the argument, saying,29
The mere fact that [plaintiff's deed] contains a restriction as to use of
the lots thereby conveyed, could in no wise be binding upon others
acquiring lots within such addition, unless there was embodied in
the deeds under which they hold a similar restriction. It will be
noticed, too, that it is not alleged that the [grantor] made any agree-
ment to or did embody in other conveyances it might make similar
restrictions, but only that such was its custom.
The language of the court, in light of the facts, is vague. The case
may be read as based on several points: (1) there is no writing; (2)
the court indicated that there may be a lack of notice (restrictions
were not in the defendant's chain of title); (3) the court, judging
from the language of the last sentence in the foregoing quotation, may
have found a lack of intention to create a general scheme. Of course,
intention to create a general scheme can be found through means
other than an agreement. It can be found, in the absence of an express
agreement, by the general, orderly and consistent lay-out of a sub-
division. Any one of these factors could well be the basis of the case
but the court does not indicate that it considered one controlling. No
further conclusion can be safely drawn.
A decision, a few years later, with strong dictum to the effect that
a writing is required to bind subsequent vendees was issued by the
court in Holliday v. Sphar.30 Here, the original grantor of the tract of
28 186 Ky. 794, 218 S.W. 257 (1920).
29 Id. at 218 S.W. 258. Contra Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W.
496 (1925).30262 Ky. 45, 89 S.W. 2d 327 (1936).
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land inserted certain restrictions in the deeds which he conveyed.
These restrictions were recorded and written on the plat. One restric-
tion provided that no dwelling house shall be built closer than twenty-
five feet to the street. The grantor failed to insert in the deeds that the
lots in the subdivision were to be used for "residence purposes only."
The grantor did, however, by his advertisements31 clearly imply that
the lots were only for residential purposes. The defendant bought a
lot and was about to build a service station when the circuit court
granted an injunction enjoining such construction. The defendant con-
tended that the "twenty-five feet frontage" clause could not be con-
strued as limiting the property only to residences. The plaintiff main-
tained that the "twenty-five" provision plus the advertisements showed
a clear intention to restrict mutually all the property to residences.
The court, using a narrow construction and finding for the defendant,
held that the words of the covenant could not be construed as restrict-
ing the property to residences. However, the court, in its language,
went beyond the facts3 2 of the case and said,33
The vendor's oral representations, or his advertisements
of the sale of the lots, that the land is to be wholly devoted to one
purpose is not operative as an estoppel to use a portion of it for a
nonrestricted purpose. Such is merely to be considered as a circum-
stance in ascertaining from the language used in the deed the in-
tention of the parties to the deed containing the restrictions.
The court indicates, by this language, that oral evidence can only
be used to aid in construing the written instrument, and that an oral
promise can not be used as the sole basis for binding subsequent
vendees under a restrictive covenant. The Sphar decision uses strong
language indicating a need for a writing but the case actually turns on
the issue of construction. No more than this can be said.
A third Kentucky case, McCurdy v. Standard Realty Corporation,4
contains language which may indicate a need for a writing. There, the
common grantor inserted racial restrictions in plaintiff's deed and made
oral representations (public advertisements and announcements) that
similar provisions would be inserted in the remaining lots. These the
grantor failed to insert. The grantor sold to Negroes and the plaintiff
sued, alleging breach of restrictions imposed by a general scheme
and the representations of the grantor.
31 Id. at 89 S.W. 2d 328 for the full advertisement.32 If it had been definitely alleged and established that the advertisements
were oral representations that the property was to be used for "residences only"-
then the quoted statement would be holding, not dictum. The point was not
litigated.
33 Supra note 30 at 89 S.W. 2d 329.
34295 Ky. 587, 175 S.W. 2d 28 (1943).
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The court, holding for the defendant stated,3 5
The appellants case is deficient, it seems to us, in respect
to the time and character [i.e., they were oral] of the representations
claimed to have been made, and weak in respect to the notice or
knowledge of the appellee .... The advertisements and public an-
nouncements relating to the ineffective auctioning of the lots . . .
cannot be regarded in and of themselves as creating the burden of an
encumbrance as against subsequent bona fide purchasers. (italics
added).
This case, like the others, may turn on several points: (1) there is
no writing; (2) there probably is no notice although the court ex-
pressly avoids this problem; (3) there is only vague evidence of in-
tention to bind the section where the defendant bought. This case is
probably the strongest of the three foregoing cases in its requirement
of a writing. But, it does not state the basis of its decision, i.e., was
violation of the statute of frauds an essential part of the finding?
A recent decision, McLean v. Thurman,36 goes a long way in strik-
ing down the requirement of a writing to bind subsequent vendees to
the covenants of their vendors. The court uses general language to the
effect that it would not require a writing to bind the land retained by
the covenantee when, in quoting from American Jurisprudence, it
states, 37
The governing principle involved is: Where the owner
of two or more lots situated near one another conveys one of the lots
with express building restrictions applying thereto in favor of the land
retained by the grantor, the servitude becomes mutual, and during
the period of restraint, the owner of the lots retained may do nothing
that is forbidden to the owner of the lot sold. Such a restriction is
said to create a reciprocal negative easement, which is enforceable
against the grantor of a subsequent purchaser of the lot from his
with notice, actual or constructive.
This statement is broad enough to stand for the proposition that
no writing is necessary to bind a subsequent vendee to oral covenants
of his vendor if he has notice and if the restrictions are in writing in a
prior deed. However, the facts of the case may not support this
generalization because the deed to the covenantor contained the writ-
ten promise by the grantor that the remaining lots would be similarly
restricted.
In light of the foregoing cases, a rule as to the requirement of a
writing is difficult to state. Few cases, factually, have squarely pre-
sented the question. Nearly all the cases present facts that embody
vague evidence of intention and notice. However, it seems, in light of
35 Id. at 175 S.W. 2d 32.36 273 S.W. 2d 825 (Ky. 1954).
371d. at 829.
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the dicta of the McLean and Bagby decisions, that the modem Ken-
tucky Court would enforce any oral promises of the covenantor to bind
his land when the covenantee's restriction is written in the original
agreement. But the dicta and language of the foregoing cases make it
doubtful the court would enforce an oral promise if no written restric-
tion at all were placed in the deed between the covenantor and
covenantee.
TOUCH AND CONCERN
The fourth element required by orthodox doctrine to bind a vendee
to the covenants of his vendor is that the covenant touch and concern
the land. The meaning of this phrase is somewhat elusive and has at
times been confused with privity. It is impossible to state exact tests
to determine those covenants which touch and concern and those
covenants which do not.38 However, one method, though somewhat
circular, has been suggested which approaches the problem from the
effect of the covenant upon the legal relations of the parties." 9 If the
promisor's legal relations in respect to land are lessened (interest as
owner less valuable), then the burden touches and concerns the land.
If the promisee's legal relations are increased (interest as owner more
valuable), the benefit touches and concerns the land.
No Kentucky cases have been found which present facts where
the covenant does not touch and concern the land and only a few
mention the requirement by name. The Swiss Oil4" case makes the
clearest statement on this matter when it says,41
If the thing to be done is merely collateral to the land,
and does not touch and concern the thing demised, then the as-
signee is not charged, though named in the covenant. ... The im-
portant consideration is whether the covenant is intended to be and
is annexed to the estate.
Such language clearly indicates that a covenant must touch and
concern the land before it will be enforced although the intention
language may somewhat weaken this conclusion.
A second case which refers to touch and concern is Ferguson v.
Worrall42 for it states,
[Wihether a covenant will or will not run with the land
does not, however, so much depend on whether it is to be performed
on the land itself, as on whether it tends directly or necessarily to
enhance its value or render it more beneficial or convenient to those
by whom it is used or occupied.
38 Clark, supra note 2 at 97.
3 9 Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases, 12 Mich. L.R. 6839 (1914).
See Neponsit Property Owner's Ass'n., Inc. v. Emigrant Ind. Say. Bank, 278 N.Y.
248, 15 N.E. 2d 793 (1938).
40 Supra note 12 at 22 S.W. 2d 914.
41 Ibid. 42 Supra note 16 at 101 S.W. 968.
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The foregoing cases are the only ones in which the Kentucky court
has specifically referred to the requirement of touch and concern.
The last case is 1929. In all cases examined the covenants in fact have
touched and concerned the land.
NOTICE
Notice has always been a requirement in equity and at law in
order to bind a subsequent vendee to the covenants of his vendor.
This is still true in Kentucky today.43
RECENT CASE TRENDS
The language used by the Kentucky court in several recent cases
may give insight into the present trend of decisions in their require-
ments for a covenant to bind subsequent owners of land. The court,
from its statements, seems to place very little emphasis on the classical
requirements of the common law. It now speaks in terms of equitable
servitudes, 4 - where formerly it spoke of restrictive covenants running
with the land. The equitable and legal concepts of covenants, in terms
of language, now seem to be used interchangeably. Cases, which on
their facts would support covenants running at law if damages were
asked for, use the language of equitable servitudes. The case of
McFarland v. Hanley,45 talking exclusively in servitude language, at-
tempts to summarize the present status of restrictions in Kentucky
when it states,
Probably in no single subject of the law is there found a
greater divergence of opinion among the courts of the several states
than on the nature, extent, and construction of covenants restricting
building and the use of land. Such covenants have been variously
referred to as creating rights in the nature of servitudes, easements,
equitable easements, amenities, reciprocal negative easements, or as
equities in favor of adjoining land. Such rights are denominated in
this State as mutual, reciprocal, equitable easements of the nature of
servitudes in favor of other lots of a plot of which all were once a
part. There is also a contrariety of opinion as to whether such restric-
tions run with the land. Kentucky, with a majority of jurisdictions,
is firmly committed to the view46 that such covenants constitute
property rights which run with the land. (italics added)
43 See Carroll, Real Property-Notice of Restrictive Covenants in Kentucky,
45 Ky. L.J. 172, 179 (1956) for an extensive discussion of the requirement of
notice.44 See, McCurdy v. Standard Realty Co., 295 Ky. 587, 175 S.W. 2d 28
(1948); Bagby v. Stewart's Ex'r., 265 S.W. 2d 75 (Ky. 1954); McLean v. Thur-
man, 273 S.W. 2d 825 (Ky. 1954); Robertson v. Western Baptist Hospital, 267
S.W. 2d 895 (Ky. 1954).
45 258 S.W. 2d 3, 4 (Ky. 1953). The restrictions were inserted in all the
deeds.46 This is important dictum on a long debated point. See, American Law of
Property sees. 9.30 and 9.34 (1952).
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Another recent Kentucky case employs the language of equity
when it states, 47
[W]e are among the jurisdictions which adhere to the
concept that such [residential] restrictions constitute mutual, recipro-
cal, equitable easements in the nature of a servitude in favor of
owners of other lots of a plot of which all were once a part; ... and
if it be inequitable to have injunctive relief, to recover damages.
(italics added).
Again all the attributes of a covenant at law are present but the
court still speaks with the tongue of equity. The case implies that no
distinction remains between covenants at law and covenants in equity
when it speaks of damages for breach of a servitude.
The least that can be said about the foregoing court language is
that it represents a trend in Kentucky of generally applying the con-
cepts of equitable servitudes to restrictions placed on land. Such a
trend, if it continues, will probably lead the court to adopt the liberal
requirements of equity (notice and intent) 47a as being necessary to
bind subsequent purchasers to the covenants of the original owner.
POLICY EXAMINATION
Historically, a general policy has existed against anything which
tends to limit the free use of land. However, during the last century,
the courts found that many covenants were actually beneficial to the
land, i.e., the covenants were the first assurance to the community
that the neighborhood character would remain stable. This in turn
insured real estate values and preserved a pleasant and enjoyable
community in which to live. In order to give effect to these beneficial
covenants, the equity court enforced covenants, which were unenforce-
able at law, as equitable servitudes. 48 Certainly, in recent years,
restrictive covenants have been looked upon as beneficial-even as a
necessity. Such a philosophy was stated only recently in a Kentucky
decision,49
As a general proposition it may be said that, when build-
ing restrictions first came into use, they were looked upon as restric-
tions against the individual owner of property and were scrutinized
carefully to avoid the untrammeled use of real property. In recent
years, however, they have come into rather general use in metro-
47 Ashland-Boyd City County Health Dept. v. Biggs, 252 S.W. 2d 922, 925
(Ky. 1952) (restrictions in all deeds).47a Jones v. Lambert, 298 S.W. 2d 297 (Ky. 1957) (notice and intention
emphasized.)
48 Reno, The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land, 28 Va. L.R. 951,
970 (1942).
49 Dorsey v. Fisherman's Wharf Realty Co., 306 Ky. 445, 449, 207 S.W. 2d
565, 567 (1947). McFarland v. Hanley, 258 S.W. 2d 3, 4 (Ky. 1953) stated
that the strict rule of construction had often been given only lip service.
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politan areas and are looked upon more in the nature of a protection
to the property owner and the public rather than a restriction as to
the use of property.
The court clearly implies in this and other cases5" that the past strict
rules of construction5' of covenants are no longer to be followed. The
Kentucky court has apparently shifted to a policy of liberal construc-
tion.
In light of this shift in basic policy, to what extent should the rules
relating to covenants be retained?
(1) Privity. Privity has only been mentioned in one Kentucky
case (1929) as dictum. The cases, factually, contain the elements of
privity but no mention is made of it. Apparently Kentucky has never
placed any emphasis on the necessity of this element for it has not
been mentioned in twenty-eight years. Certainly no rational argu-
ment, either in history or policy,52 can be made in favor of the common
law privity of estate which requires something more than succession
of estate between the covenanting party and his transferee. Even if
privity does state a rational requirement, most vendees can be held
under equitable servitude theory anyway. Thus, no mere technical
rule, originally used to keep property unburdened by restrictions,
should now be applied when such restrictions are now considered
beneficial.
(2) Intention. Kentucky has always required this to be present,
both in law and equity, in order that subsequent assigns of the
covenanting parties be bound by the terms of the covenant. The new
policy of liberal construction enables the court more frequently to
give effect to the parties' intention. The requirement of intention is
sound. A basic social principle of our society is that individual volition
should, within the confines of social policy, be given effect by the
courts. If the parties do not intend for the covenants to run, there is
no policy that should move the court to act as a land planner. If the
parties choose not to restrict their land, why should the state restrict
it for them?
(3) Writing. The older Kentucky cases indicate that a writing
may be necessary in order to bind subsequent assigns to the covenant.
However, the language of recent decisions seems to imply that this
may no longer be true if the assignee has notice of an oral agreement.
The basis given for a need for a writing is the statute of frauds. How-
ever, in the situation herein discussed (i.e. where the covenantee and
50 Ibid.
51 See Holliday v. Sphar, 806 Ky. 495, 207 S.W. 2d 565 (1947).
52 Clark, supra note 2 at 116.
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covenantor execute a written agreement and the covenantee orally
promises to similarly restrict the remainder of his land) there is no
good reason for not enforcing the oral agreement. Technically the
statute of frauds could be said to be satisfied by the writing between
the covenantor and covenantee5 3 Some courts enforce the oral agree-
ment by saying that parties with notice are estopped in equity to assert
the statute of frauds.54 It seems that there is no need to do by in-
direction what the courts could do directly. Why do not the courts
just state that the statute of frauds is not applicable to this situation?
After all, most of the cases do not even discuss the statute.55 It seems
that the main purpose the statute serves in these cases is to give notice
to subsequent purchasers. If they already have notice, then there is
no overriding reason for requiring a writing. Certainly, it would be
inequitable to destroy a general building scheme because of a lack
of a second writing.
(4) Touch and Concern. In every case examined the covenant
touched and concerned the land in every sense of the phrase that has
been suggested. Very few decisions, however, mention the require-
ment. Therefore, it is impossible to know whether the requirement
still exists. Nevertheless, in light of the new policy of liberal construc-
tion this element should be retained. The new liberal construction
is based on the fact that the covenants benefit land. If the covenant
does not touch and concern it can not benefit the property. There is
no reason why, even today, land should be encumbered indefinitely
without conferring a benefit.
CONCLUSION
There is a definite trend in the modern Kentucky court to allow
restrictive covenants to be applied freely to realty. No longer are
strict rules of the common law required. In fact, a sanguine person
might even conclude that today there is no difference of any con-
sequence as between "equitable servitudes" and "covenants at law";
the terms may be used interchangeably and the requirements for a
covenant to run are the traditional requirements of equity.
Luther House
53 2 American Law of Property 432 (1952).
54 Johnson v. Mt. Baker Park Presbyterian Church, 113 Wash. 458, 194 P.
536 (1920).
55 Supra note 53 at 433.
